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ABSTRACT
Funding the production of quality online content is a pressing
problem for content producers. The most common funding method,
online advertising, is rife withwell-known performance and privacy
harms, and an intractable subject-agent conflict: many users do not
want to see advertisements, depriving the site of needed funding.
Because of these negative aspects of advertisement-based fund-
ing, paywalls are an increasingly popular alternative for websites.
This shift to a “pay-for-access” web is one that has potentially huge
implications for the web and society. Instead of a system where
information (nominally) flows freely, paywalls create a web where
high quality information is available to fewer and fewer people,
leaving the rest of the web users with less information, that might
be also less accurate and of lower quality. Despite the potential
significance of a move from an “advertising-but-open” web to a
“paywalled” web, we find this issue understudied.
This work addresses this gap in our understanding by measuring
how widely paywalls have been adopted, what kinds of sites use
paywalls, and the distribution of policies enforced by paywalls. A
partial list of our findings include that (i) paywall use has increased,
and at an increasing rate (2× more paywalls every 6 months), (ii)
paywall adoption differs by country (e.g., 18.75% in US, 12.69% in
Australia), (iii) paywall deployment significantly changes how users
interact with the site (e.g., higher bounce rates, less incoming links),
(iv) the median cost of an annual paywall access is 108 USD per site,
and (v) paywalls are in general trivial to circumvent.
Finally, we present the design of a novel, automated system for
detecting whether a site uses a paywall, through the combination
of runtime browser instrumentation and repeated programmatic
interactions with the site. We intend this classifier to augment
future, longitudinal measurements of paywall use and behavior.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Publishers are increasingly moving away from ad-based models,
because of the well-known failures [41] of ad-based internet fund-
ing models. The most common adopted alternative is for sites to
deploy “paywalls”. “Paywalls” here are a broad term for mone-
tization systems where visitors are charged subscription fees to
access site content, sometimes after being able to sample a small
amount of content for free. The upsides of paywall systems are
well understood (i.e., they promise to enable the continued creation
of high-quality content). Less understood are the risks and larger
implications of an increasingly “walled” web. Possible risks include
reducing societal access to news and information and the privacy
harms of the increased user tracking needed to enforce paywalls.
This work aims to improve the understanding of the popularity,
risks and benefits of paywalls online. To introduce the topic, we first
(i) describe why the web is increasingly moving away from “open”
models to “paywalled” models, (ii) outline why this transition is an
important topic of study for the research community, and then (iii)
present the structure of the rest of the paper.
1.1 The Move from Ads to Paywalls
Digital advertising is the current dominant monetization method
for web publishers, and funds much of the web. Publishers sell
advertisements along page content; middle parties buy these ad
slots and fill them with images and content provided by clients
and ad-agencies. This process is usually programmatic, based of
user’s personal (i.e., behavioral) data, and completed via real-time
programmatic auctions [37, 42].
Web sites are increasingly unsatisfied from this ad-based funding
system, for many reasons. First, the system is dominated by two
parties, Google and Facebook, who jointly harvest more than 70%
of global ad revenues [18, 46], reducing the publisher’s “take” for ad
placements through market power. Second, ad-based funding sys-
tems suffer from significant and increasing rates of fraud [8, 14, 15,
27, 64], depriving web sites of further funding. Third, behavioral ad-
vertising systems are increasingly incompatible with individual and
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legal privacy demands [26, 38, 40, 48, 59]. Last, users increasingly
use ad blocking tools, for a variety of privacy, performance, and
aesthetic reasons [34, 57], further depriving publishers of revenue.
As a result, ad revenues have decreased in recent years. Both big
and small publishers are coming up short on advertising revenue,
even if they are long on visitors traffic. Accounts of publisher-loss
under ad-based funding models contain figures as high as 95% [28].
The difficulties of ad-based funding systems have pushed pub-
lishers to alternative funding models, including donations [16, 63]
or in-browser crypto-mining [39]. The most common alternative
though is “paywalls”, where users pay publishers directly to ac-
cess the content they create [29] Figure 1 shows a representative
example of a paywall system.
Paywalls so far have a mixed record as funding systems for
publishers. Publishers with large, loyal audiences and high-quality
content tend to be successful with this subscription strategy, with
The New York Times [17], Wired [3], The Financial Times [9] and
The Wall Street Journal [61] as prominent successful examples. The
success of paywalls for smaller and more targeted sites (e.g., local
news), or sites with less affluent audiences, is less clear.
It is important to note that the rapid growth of paywalls has
drawn the attention of big tech companies like Google, Facebook
and Apple, who have started building platforms to provide or sup-
port paywall services [25, 49, 51, 58], in an effort to claim their
share of the market.
1.2 Understanding the State of Paywalls
Creating a sustainable system to fund news and related content is
an important goal, and paywalls seem to be a promising (partial)
solution to the problem. However, this move from “open” to “walled”
business strategies brings significant, understudied risks. For exam-
ple, paywalls (implicitly or otherwise) may impose a “class system”
on the web [11, 50], potentially driving information-seeking visi-
tors who cannot afford to pay for subscriptions to badly-sourced,
less-vetted, or even intentionally false (but free) new sources.
Despite the importance of the rise of paywalls to the web, it is
surprising how little the topic has been studied by the research
community. Important open questions include how popular paywall
systems are, what policies paywalls impose, how users are tracked
for paywall enforcement, and whether paywalls are effective at
protecting premium content.
1.3 Contributions
In this work, we aim to improve the understanding of paywall
systems through the first systematic study of paywalls on widely-
used web sites. This work makes the following contributions to the
understanding of paywall systems on the web:
(1) A novel system for programmatically determining if a
site is using a paywall, though the combination of multiple
crowd-sourced data sets and tools.
(2) A case study of how a popular paywall library operates,
from how a publisher deploys it, how the paywall identifies
users, to how the configured content access policy is enforced.
(3) A large-scale measurement of paywall popularity, includ-
ing what kinds and what countries account for most paywall
use, and how paywall use has changed over time. Example
(a) Truncated article in Wall Street Journal.
(b) Obscured article in Miami Herald.
Figure 1: Examples of raised paywalls in major news sites.
Paywalls may be enforced in different ways to deny access
to articles to non-subscribed users.
results include finding that paywall use has increased dramat-
ically over time (2× more paywalls every 6 months) and that
paywall adoption differs by country (e.g., 18.75% in US, 12.69%
in Australia) and industry.
(4) An in-depth, large scale analysis of deployedpaywall poli-
cies, including subscription costs, how paywall adoption im-
pacts the hosting website, how robust paywalls are to evasion,
the mechanisms paywalls use to prevent users from viewing
protected content, and the privacy implications of paywalls.
(5) A classifier for deterringwhether a site is using a paywall
for use on sites not considered by crowd-sourced resources, for
future long term, web scale measurements of paywall adoption
and behavior.
2 BACKGROUND
Paywalls are an increasingly popular monetization strategy for
web sites, as publishers attempt to become less dependent on ad-
vertising. Figure 1 shows a typical paywall, where a publisher is
blocking access to content until the user pays a fee. To enforce
access control, paywalls track the engagement of the user with
the publisher content: i.e., how much time they spend on a web
site, how many articles they have read, how many times a user has
visited the website.
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Browser Content Provider Tinypass
1.Browser makes initial request 
for webpage content.
2. Website responds with HTML, 
including a reference to code 
hosted by Tinypass.
3. Browser fetches Tinypass 
hosted Javascript, along with 
possible client-set parameters. 
4. Browser executes Tinypass code, which 
fingerprinting the browser, checks for ad-
blockers, and builds content-details.
5. Tinypass code makes network request back to 
Tinypass server, which responds with a description of 
whether the visitor can view the content. 
6. If the Tinypass server instructs the Tinypass 
Javascript code that the user can not view 
the content, the code obscures or otherwise 
prevents the visitor from reading. 
Figure 2: High level overview of the core functionality of a
paywalled website powered by Tinypass.
2.1 Types of Paywalls
We group paywalls into two categories, based on how restrictive
they are: (i) hard paywalls, where users cannot gain access the site
without first purchasing a subscription (e.g., monthly or annual sub-
scriptions) and (ii) soft paywalls that allow limited, free-of-charge
viewing for a specific amount of time or number of visit (e.g., 5 free
articles per month per user).
Hard Paywalls. Hard paywalls require subscriptions before visi-
tors can access content (e.g., Financial Times requires a subscription
before the user can read any article). Such a strategy runs the risk of
deterring users and thereby diminishing the publisher’s influence
over all. As reported in the press [30], The Times experienced a 90%
drop in traffic after introducing a hard paywall.
Soft or Metered Paywalls. Soft (or metered) paywalls limit the
number of articles a viewer can read before requiring a paid sub-
scription. Soft paywalls use the free articles as a strategy to entice
users to subscribe. Soft paywalls require some method (often a
JavaScript snippet on the user-side) for measuring either the num-
ber of articles a user has accessed, or the time a user spends in
browsing the website’s articles.
As with hard paywalls, a publisher’s web traffic can also be af-
fected by the installation of soft paywalls (e.g., traffic to the New
York Times declined by 5% to 15% one month after the installation
of its soft paywall [43, 52]). Overall, though, fewer users are discour-
aged by soft paywalls. Prior studies [21] have found, on average,
retention rates for publishers with soft paywalls reaching 58.5%,
compared to only 15–20% for publishers with hard paywall.
3 PAYWALL CASE STUDY
This section provides a detailed case study of a popular third-party
paywall system. We provide this case study (i) to introduce the
reader to how paywalls work, and (ii) to document the kinds of
privacy-affecting behaviors paywalls often rely on to impose their
policies. We select Piano’s Tinypass paywall-as-a-service prod-
uct [44] for our case study for several reasons. First, it is one of the
most popular third-party paywall providers (Tinypass owns 38.2%
of the market, as measured in Figure 11), so understanding how
var _getFingerprint = function () {
if (fingerprint) {
return fingerprint;
}
var fingerprint_raw = _getLocality ();
fingerprint_raw += _getBrowserPlugin ();
fingerprint_raw += _getInstalledFonts ();
fingerprint_raw += _getScreen ();
fingerprint_raw += _getUserAgent ();
fingerprint_raw += _getBrowserObjects ();
fingerprint = murmurhash3.x64hash128(fingerprint_raw)
;
util.debug("Current browser fingerprint is: " +
fingerprint);
return fingerprint;
};
Listing 1: Excerpt of Tinypass’s fingerprinting JavaScript.
this system works provides a good understanding of the kinds of
paywall code users are likely to experience. And second, Tinypass
can be deployed as a configurable, paywall-as-a-service, allowing
publishers (blogs, news sites, magazines, etc.) to impose a variety
of paywall policies, both hard and soft.
3.1 Tinypass: The protocol
At some point prior to the user’s visit, a site owner creates an
account at Tinypass, where they describe the subscription policies
they wish to enforce. Tinypass generates the keys and identifiers
used to enforce the paywall and track visitors. Once a site owner
installs Tinypass on their site, the paywall works in the following
six stages, with numbers corresponding to Figure 2:
Step one. The user’s browser makes a request to a website where
the site owner has installed Tinypass.
Step two. The website responds with the HTML of their page,
including a reference to the Tinypass JavaScript library, hosted
on Tinypass’s servers. The content provider’s response may also
include optional, customized parameters that allow Tinypass to
integrate with other services, like Facebook and Google Analytics.
At the time of this writing, Tinypass’s code is hosted at https:
//code.tinypass.com/tinypass.js.
Step three. The referenced JavaScript causes the browser to re-
quest code from Tinypass’s server, which responds with a boot-
strapping system, providing basic routines for fetching the main
implementation code, helper libraries, and utilities for rate limit-
ing and fingerprinting. Depending on the particular deployment,
minified versions of this code also includes common utilities like
CommonJS-style dependency tools or cryptography libraries.
Step four. The browser executes the complete Tinypass library,
and the full (post-bootstrap) Tinypass library performs a number
of privacy-relevant checks. First, Tinypass attempts to determine
if a site visitor is actually an automated browser (e.g., Puppeteer,
WebDriver client). Tinypass attempts to determine if the user has
an ad-blocker installed. Interestingly, Tinypass not only detects if
the user currently has an ad-blocker installed, but also if the visitor
has changed their ad-blocker usage (e.g., the user had an ad-blocker
installed on a previous visit but no longer does, or vice versa).
Tinypass then generates a user fingerprint, implemented with
the code hosted at https://cdn.tinypass.com/api/libs/fingerprint.js.
The Tinypass fingerprinting library (shown in part in Listing 1)
3
...
"trackingId": "{jcx}H4sIAAAAAAAAAI2QW2vCQBCF_8s ...",
"splitTests": [],
"currentMeterName": "DefaultMeter",
"activeMeters": [
{
"meterName": "DefaultMeter",
"views": 0,
"viewsLeft": 4,
"maxViews": 4,
"totalViews": 0
}
],
...
Listing 2: Excerpt of returned Tinypass end point data
(meter is Tinypass’s terminology for a counter describing
how much more non-paywalled content a user can view).
hashes together a number of commonly known semi-unique identi-
fiers (installed plugins, preferred language, installed fonts, screen
position, user agent, etc.) to build a unique identifier, hashed to-
gether using the MurmurHash3 hash algorithm [2]). The result
is an identifier that is consistent across cookie-clears, and so can
re-identify users attempting some evasion techniques. Tinypass
also reads, if available, a first-party cookie the library also uses to
identify users. When available, this cookie is used in place of the
above fingerprint, to track how much content the user has visited.
Step five. Next, the Tinypass library gathers the above information,
combines it with information about the page, derived fingerprint-
ing values, the date, and other similar data, and POSTs them to a
Tinypass endpoint 1, which records information about the page
view. The server then returns a JSON string describing a variety of
information about the page view, and excerpt of which is presented
in Listing 2. This JSON string includes a wide variety of both user-
facing and program-effecting values, including how many more
pages the user is able to visit before the paywall is triggered, possi-
bly new identifiers to rotate on the browsing session, whether the
user has logged in and is known to Tinypass (e.g. the user logged
in on a different domain owned by the same publisher).
Step six. Finally, the Tinypass code running on the browser en-
forces the described paywall policy. The code, client-side, uses the
response data to decide how to respond to the page view, possibly
by obscuring page content or presenting a subscription offer dialog
(by default, Tinypass offers pre-made-but-configurable modal and
“inline” dialogues the website can check from). In the pages we
observed, Tinypass only enforced subscription requirements (i.e.,
preventing users from viewing content) after the above check was
completed. A side effect of this implementation decisions is that
Tinypass’s restrictions can be circumvented by simply blocking the
Tinypass library (see Section 5).
4 CURRENT PAYWALL DEPLOYMENTS
In this section, we present a large-scale measurement of paywall
deployments on the web. The measurements presented give a broad
assessment of how often paywalls are used (by country and by
industry). We then present a variety of measurements of how de-
ployed paywalls operate, including the access policies they enforce,
1https://experience.tinypass.com/xbuilder/experience/execute?aid=*
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Figure 3: Growth of paywall deployments per 6 months.
Note that the y-axis depicts the growth-rate, and not abso-
lute numbers.
their enforcement mechanisms, and how robust these paywalls are
to circumvention. The section begins with a description of how
we gathered there relevant datasets for measurements, and then
proceeds in the above described order.
4.1 Dataset
To conduct the measurements described in this section, we built
an oracle to determine whether a web site uses a paywall. While
seemingly a simple question, the diversity of paywall libraries,
enforcement mechanisms, access policies and varying verbiage
makes this a difficult question to answer without significant human
intervention. To solve this problem, we draw on two existing crowd-
sourced datasets:
A)Extensions. First, we extract rules from several popular browser
extensions [1, 13, 24, 35] designed to help users circumvent pay-
walls. By examining the source code of these extensions, we are
able to (directly or indirectly) identify 147 websites that the tools’
authors and maintainers label as using paywalls.
B) Filter lists. Second, we use a popular, crowd-maintained filter
list that identifies third-party paywall libraries [7] so that they can
be blocked with common filter-list consuming tools (e.g., AdBlock
Plus, uBlock Origin). This list includes filter rules for blocking
resources related to a variety of internet “annoyances”; we extract
the subset of the list specifically targeting paywalls. This gives us
a list of 43 third-party paywall libraries. We query for each entry
of this paywall libraries list in two existing, current web crawl
archives (i.e., HTTPArchive [22] and PublicWWW [47]). We found
1,563 sites using one of these paywall libraries and we labeled them
as “paywalled”.
We combine the above two approaches (i.e., paywalled domains
labeled by browser extensions and paywalled sites including third-
party paywall libraries) to identify 1,710 unique paywall-using
domains, from 61 countries. This dataset, summarized in Figure 4,
Data Volume
Paywalled websites from bypassing extensions 147
Third-party paywall libraries 43
Unique paywalled sites 1,710
Countries the paywalled sites originate from 61
Figure 4: Summary of our crowdsourced dataset labeling
which websites use paywalls.
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comprises our complete dataset of paywalled sites used as an oracle
in this section, and we provide open-sourced2.
4.2 Paywall Popularity
We start by measuring how popular paywalls are, across several
dimensions. We use the domains identified in Section 4 as the set
of paywalled sites, and all other sites on the web as not paywalled.
4.2.1 Increase in Paywall Use. We first measure whether paywall
use has increased over time. We find sites in our dataset started
using paywalls in 2015, with overall paywall use strictly increasing
since. Paywall use has increased at a rate between 120% and 230%
every six months since 2015 until recently. In the first six months
of 2019, paywall use quadrupled, and has grown by a further 180%
during the first two months in the second half of 2019. These mea-
sures are summarized in Figure 3.
We measure paywall growth over time by applying our pay-
wall oracle (described in Section 4.1) to archived versions of the
same sites in the Wayback Machine web archive [22]. We use these
archived versions of each site to approximate date each site adopted
a paywall. The precise methodology is as follows:
(1) We build the set of paywall library related URLs and domains
using the technique described in Section 4.1.
(2) We fetch the most recent archive of each paywalled website
in our dataset from the Wayback machine and check whether
that historical version is using a paywall.
(3) If we observe the site using a paywall, we fetch the next-most-
recent version of the site from the Wayback machine (e.g., we
move back one recording in time) and re-check.
(4) We continue this process until we encounter a version of the
web site that no longer is using a paywall. Once we encounter a
non-paywalled version of the site, we note the date that version
of the site and record it as when the site began using a paywall.
Limitations. We note two limitations of the above approach, and
why we do not believe they significantly impact our findings. It
is possible that earlier versions of sites used different types and
providers of paywalls than current sites, and so our paywall detec-
tion oracle may be missing historical paywall use. While possible,
we do not think this limitation significantly impacts the results
2https://gist.github.com/panpap/68af1c99b49366dfce4044a354f6e1b8
for two reasons: (i) prior research [60] has found that filter lists
(like the ones we use for paywall library detection) rarely delete
rules, and so that paywall-targeting filter lists would identify both
current and historical paywalls. What is more, (ii) we manually
evaluated a random sample of commits from the git history of the
paywall-targeting portion of the filter list and we found no rule
deletions. This gives us further confidence, though not certainty,
that filter rules that would identify paywalls on previous versions
of paywalled sites have not been removed.
The second possible limitation is that our approach might miss
sites that used to have paywalls, but no longer do. We believe such
cases to be rare. We observed no instances of sites using paywalls,
removing the paywalls, and then re-establishing it. This suggests
(though does not prove) that sites do not commonly abandon pay-
wall strategies once they have adopted them.
4.2.2 Paywall Use by Site Type. We measure what types of con-
tent paywalled sites provide. We find that most (80.3%) paywalled
sites provide some form of news content, whether targeted at the
local, regional, or world-level. Figure 5 provides summary of this
measurement. For this measurement, we use the sites identified as
using paywalls from Section 4.1 with information available from the
Alexa Top Sites service. The Alexa Top Sites classifies domains into
one of 17 different classes (i.e., news, sports, business, arts, society).
Three categories describe news content, though at different levels of
focus (e.g., “World”, “Regional” or, generically, “News”). We group
these together for our measurements, since they are thematically
very similar. The remaining 14 categories account for just 19.7% of
paywalled sites.
4.2.3 Paywall Use by Country. Next, we measure which countries
have the highest rates of paywall use. Because news sites account
for most paywall use, we focus this measurement on news sites.
We find that US news sites have been the quickest to move to pay-
walls, followed by Australia, France, Canada and Germany. Figure 6
summarizes our findings. Since our oracle do not identify all web-
sites with paywalls, Figure 6 presents only the lower bound of the
existing paywalled sites.
We measure rates of paywall use by country by first retrieving
the Alexa the Top 10,000 websites per country. We then filter the list
and remove all non-news sites. We then calculate the percentage
of paywall using news sites, as a fraction of all news sites, per
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Figure 11: Popularity of third-party paywall libraries in our
dataset. A small number of paywall implementations ac-
count for the majority of third-party paywall deployments.
country. We find that 18.75% of US news sites use paywalls, 12.69%
of Australian new sites, and less than 7% in all other countries.
4.2.4 Paywall Use by Popularity. Next, we measure whether there
is any clear relationship between paywall deployment and the pop-
ularity of a website. We did not observe any such relationship. We
anticipate that most paywalled sites would be popular (as mea-
sured by Alexa Top Sites), as a successful paywall would require a
significant number of subscribers, which in turn would require a
significant amount of baseline visitors. Instead, we find that only
8.54% of paywall-using sites are among the 10,000 most popular
sites on the web. The median paywall-using site is ranked 365,316.
The full distribution of the popularity of paywall using sites is
presented in Figure 7.
4.3 Paywall Libraries
A significant number of sites rely on third-parties for their paywall
implementations. These third-parties sell “paywall-as-a-service”
products, where publishers pay fee to have the third-party manage
and enforce the paywall on the publisher’s site. We observe that a
small number of paywall providers account for the vast majority
of paywall deployments, with Piano and Tecnavia being the most
popular paywall providers (23.5% and 21.0% market share, respec-
tively). The full distribution of third-party paywall market share is
depicted in Figure 11.
This consolidation of paywall implementation and enforcement
is significant, for a variety of reasons. First, market consolidation
may effect the amount of income content-makers can receive for
their content (popular third-party paywall providers receive 10-
15% of each sold subscription). Second, provider consolidation may
make large scale circumvention easier, as circumventors need to
target a smaller number of systems (see Section 5). Third, a small
number of paywall providers tracking users across a large number
of websites has clear privacy implications (see Section 4.6).
We measure the popularity and consolidation of third-party
paywall libraries by crawling each paywalled site in our dataset
and observing which resources from known paywall providers were
fetched. We find that at least 25% of paywalled websites outsource
their paywall functionality to third-parties. The distribution of third
party paywall use follows a rough power-law distribution.
4.4 Paywall Polices
Next, We measure the distribution of policies enforced by paywalls.
We find that paywalls vary widely by type, enforcement mechanism,
and how much, if any, content visitors can view before needing to
pay. For these measurements, we randomly sample 115 paywall-
using websites from our dataset for manual evaluation.
4.4.1 The different types of Paywalls. First, we observe that 66.7%
of paywalls are “soft” (i.e., allow some free content access), 15.7%
are “hard” (i.e., allow no free access), with the remaining 16.6% pay-
walled sites using a “hybrid” strategy (i.e., some content is free, some
requires payment, based on the editor/time of publication/topic,
etc.). Some “hybrid” publishers use machine learning or other dy-
namic approaches to determine per-user whether an article should
be locked or not [19, 45, 56].
4.4.2 Enforcement Mechanism. We also measure the distribution
of paywall enforcement techniques. Despite the heterogeneity of
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a daily basis 13.42% less pages on a pay-
walled news site.
the paywall implementations, we see only three approaches used
to enforce paywalls: (i) truncating article text, (ii) obfuscating the
article with popups, or (iii) redirecting users to a subscription page.
We measure the popularity of each of the above approaches in our
manually evaluated set; Figure 8 presents the results. The largest
percentage (48.2%) of the websites obfuscate or truncate (44.5%) the
article the user has not yet access to. Only a few (7.3%) redirect the
user to a login/subscribe page.
4.4.3 Allowed Free Content. We also measure the distribution of
how much content users can view before triggering a (hard or soft)
paywall. For the 15.7% of sites that use a hard-paywall strategy,
visitors cannot view any articles for free. For soft paywalls, this
number varies by publisher. Figure 9 plots the distribution of the
free articles users could consume before hitting a paywall in the
websites we tested. Overall, the median paywalled website allows
4 articles. All hard paywalled websites do not allow any access to
articles, when the median soft-paywalled website allows 3.5 articles
to be read for free. A significant number of soft paywalls (30%) that
allow 2 or fewer articles to be read before triggering enforcement.
4.4.4 Paywalls Cost. Next, we measure the distribution of paywall
subscription costs. We find that most paywall subscriptions are
monthly, that the median annual cost for paywall access is 108 USD,
and that subscription costs seem to be highest in Germany. All of
these measurements were conducted through a manual evaluation
of 105 paywalled sites. We sampled 20 sites from each of the top 6
paywall using countries. For 12 sites, we were not able to access
the site or determine the subscription costs
We first measure the distribution of subscription options for
users. 82.86% of paywall sites provide a monthly subscription op-
tion and 35.23% of sites provide an annual one. Hence, 64.76% of
the paywalled sites provide only a monthly subscription option
and 17.14% only an annual one. Next, we measure the distribution
of purchasing an annual subscription to a site’s content. The median
observed annual subscription cost is 108 USD. 22% of sites charge
less than 60 USD, 21% of sites charge more than 180 USD. Figure 10
presents the full distribution of annual subscription costs. We note
that the subscription rates we observe are lower than those esti-
mated by previous work (around 189 USD on average) [55], possibly
reflecting a general decrease in costs. We measure the distribution
of annual costs by manually noting the annual subscription cost in
the local currency. For sites that do not offer an annual subscription,
we sum the cost of twelve monthly subscriptions. We then convert
all costs to USD for comparison purposes.
Finally, we measure how subscription costs differ by country.
As depicted in Figure 12, we plot the min, the 15th percentile the
median, the 85th percentile and the max of the annual subscription
cost across the different countries. The median price of paywalls in
paywalls in Australia and Germany is highest (193 and 190 USD,
respectively). Subscription costs vary widely by site too. In Ger-
many and United States, for example, the most expensive paywalls
cost 2.63× and 3.51× more than the median rate, respectively.
4.5 How Paywalls Affect Site Use
Paywalls affect how users interact with the site. Recent studies [23],
by monitoring the pageviews of 36 news sites before and after
paywall deployment, report that they lose nearly 30% of their daily
traffic and a loss of pageviews, ranging from a 10% to 55%. In this
section, we measure differences between how sites interact with
paywalled and non-paywalled sites. We find that users view less
pages on paywalled sites, stay for shorter periods of time and link
to pages less. Interestingly, we did not see a significantly difference
to the bounce rate between paywalled and non-paywalled sites 3.
4.5.1 Bounce Rate. We find that paywalled new sites have slightly
higher bounce rates 4 than non-paywalled news sites. The distribu-
tions of bounce rates is depicted in Figure 13. The median paywalled
news site has slightly higher bounce rate (68.4%) contrary to the
median non-paywalled (67.5%). However, we see that for 30% of
the websites in the two categories the difference is 2-7% higher.
3We do not address the issue of causation; its possible, for example, that the types of
site likely to use paywalls have lower dwell times already, so that the use of a paywall
is a more a result of lower dwell time than the cause. We leave disentangling cause
and effect for future work.
4The percentage of visitors who visit a site and then leave, rather than continuing to
view other pages within the same site.
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To compare bounce rates, we used the Alexa Top Sites data, and
compared the bounce rates for the paywalled news sites in our data
set with the Alexa top 1K news sites.
4.5.2 Daily Page Views. Next, we measure the number of pages the
average visitor performs daily on the websites and we compare how
this changes for the paywalled and non-paywalled news sites. In
Figure 14, we plot the cumulative distribution of these page views
per website in our dataset. Users visit on average 13.42% less pages
on paywalled news sites than non-paywalled new sites.
4.5.3 Average Time spent on Site. Figure 15 compares the distri-
bution of the median time users spend on paywalled and non-
paywalled websites, normalized by popularity (based on its Alexa
rank). We find that visitors spend daily 2.46× more time per on
non-paywalled news sites.
4.5.4 Content Popularity and Link Rate. Finally, we measure the
impact of paywalls on how often sites link to the paywalled sites.
Since site linking may be affected by the popularity of the website,
in Figure 16, we plot the cumulative distribution of the number
of site links (or backlinks) per news site normalized by its Alexa
rank. We observed paywalled sites being linked to significantly less
(18.9×) often non-paywalled sites.
4.6 Paywalls and Privacy
Most behavioral advertising systems require users to pay for con-
tent with their privacy; users are tracked in behavioral advertising
systems, and can view “free” content. Paywalls have the possibility
of changing this system. Since users are directly paying for content,
one might hope users would no longer face the privacy harms asso-
ciated with behavioral advertising systems. Unfortunately, we see
that this is not the case. People do not generally receive a tracker
free version of site content when paying for subscriptions. Instead,
paywall systems seem to serve as an additional monetization mech-
anism on top of existing, privacy harming, ad systems.
We measure whether paying for paywall access improves user
privacy (i.e., removes the need for sites to try and monetize through
tracking) by purchasing subscriptions to 10 randomly selected pay-
walled news sites. Our goal is to examine the types of network
requests issued before and after paying for the subscription. We
create two scenarios, the vanilla (non-subscribed) user, and the pre-
mium (subscribed) user. For each selected site, we create an account
and purchased a subscription before the starting the measurement.
We also select 5 child pages on each site for evaluation. Then, we
enable the popular Disconnect plugin [5] in monitoring and no-
blocking mode, and browse each selected child page on each site
under each of the two personas, in the same order, and observe the
issued network requests. Figure 18 presents the average number
of ad- and tracking- related requests encountered in each scenario.
In the vast majority of cases, there is no significant difference in
terms of ad- or tracking- related web requests.
5 PAYWALL CIRCUMVENTION
Paywalls must be robust to circumvention if they are going to be
a successful monetization scheme for websites. If paywalls can be
easily avoided, then content producers will wind up in the same
situation they are in with ads and ad lockers; declining revenues as
circumvention tools become more popular. We find that all observed
paywalls are trivial to circumvent.
We evaluate how robust paywalls are to circumvention in two
steps: (i) we categorize the approaches of several popular paywall
Vanilla User Premium User
News site Ads Tracking Ads Tracking
heraldsun.com.au 171 13 169 9
miamiherald.com 123 12 112 11
wsj.com 63 4 61 4
kansascity.com 61 9 56 6
ft.com 20 0 11 0
salon.com 138 5 0 1
japantimes.co.jp 109 12 98 8
leparisien.fr 125 10 81 4
independent.co.uk 11 6 10 6
spectator.co.uk 18 2 14 2
Figure 18: Requests captured for vanilla and premium user.
User continues receiving the same amount of trackers and
ads in the content she receives even if she has paid for it.
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Figure 19: Data collection steps of our paywall detector’s
crawling component.
circumvention strategies, and (ii) we test each strategy on 32 pay-
walled news sites, we randomly select from our dataset. This sub-
set comprises 28 soft and 4 hard paywalls on popular websites
like Wired, Bloomberg, Spectator, Washington Post, Irish Times,
Medium, Build, Japan Times, Statesman, and Le Parisien.
5.1 Evasion Evaluated
We test the robustness of each paywall system by using Chrome
version 71. For each evaluated site, (a) we browse different pages till
we trigger the paywall, and then (b) we test a variety of bypassing
approaches to circumvent the paywall and get access to the “pro-
tected” article. Figure 17 lists the evaluated paywall-circumvention
strategies, which includes pre-packaged tools, fingerprint evasion
techniques, and third-party services. Specifically, we consider:
(1) changing the screen size dimensions
(2) hiding the user’s IP address
(3) changing the user agent string
(4) using an ad blocker extension
(5) enabling “Reader Mode”
(6) using the Pocket web service5
(7) enabling Incognito/Private Mode
(8) emptying the cookie jar
(9) blocking HTTP requests for popular paywall libraries
Overall, we are able to bypass all of the soft paywalls and none of the
hard paywalls. Hard paywalls perform their enforcement server-
side, when the soft paywalls perform their policy enforcement
client-side, and thus their access control is circumventable.
5.2 Evasion Approaches Analyzed
Many of the evaluated evasion approaches are rarely successful.
For example, changing the screen size or the IP address of the user
rarely circumvents a soft paywall (4% effectiveness). A moderate
number of soft paywalls (12%) is flummoxed by modifying the
browser’s user agent string. The majority (75%) of soft paywalls
is bypassable by resetting the cookie jar (in some cases erasing
the first-party cookie only is insufficient, since it is automatically
re-spawned by fingerprinting JavaScript code, as seen in Section 3).
5or similar “reader” services like “JustRead” [53] and “Outline” [36]
Metric Value
Precision 77%
Recall 77%
F-Measure 75%
AUROC 0.74
Figure 20: Weighted average of the performance of our RF
classifier, after k=5 cross-fold validation.
As a result, switching into browsers’ “private browsing” modes
is also sufficient to bypass most paywalls. Some paywalled sites
refuse to render content in “reader modes” or “private browsing”
modes, either first party (e.g., reader modes shipped with Safari
and Firefox) or third-party (e.g., services like Pocket [62]). Such
detection schemes are uncommon though; switching into reader-
mode, for example, circumvents paywall enforcement in 60% of
the cases. Ad-blocking extensions, in their default configurations,
have little-to-no effect on paywalls. However, by using the list of
known paywall libraries from Section 4 and by blocking requests to
these domains we are able to bypass 48% of the paywalls without
breaking the website’s main functionality.
Third-parties like Google Search, Twitter, Reddit and Facebook,
can also be used to gain access to some paywalled articles. Some
paywalls give visitors from these large third-party systems unfet-
tered access to their content, in pay-for-promotion initiatives. By
spoofing the referrer field of the HTTP GET requests, some pay-
walls are vulnerable to exploiting a controversial policy [4] where
publishers (for promotion purposes) allow access to articles when
the visitor comes from one of these platforms (by clicking on a
tweet, a post, a Google search result etc.) [6]. These mechanisms
can provide access to hard paywalled articles. As a result, some
publishers (e.g., Wall Street Journal) have stopped allowing such
special access through their paywalls [31].
6 PAYWALL DETECTION
This section presents the design and evaluation of a ML-based
detection system whose goal is to determine whether a site uses
a paywall. Our paywall detector consists of two components: (i) a
crawling component that visits a subset of pages on a site, records
information about each page’s execution, and extracts some ML
features; and (ii) a classifier, that uses the extracted features to
predict if the site uses a paywall.
We present this classifier as a partial solution for the problem
of measuring changes in the adoption and behavior of paywalls
over time. We propose this ML approach as a complement to the
crowd-sourced approach described in Section 4.1. The classifier can
be used to automatically gauge paywall prevalence. This automated
approach can help identify and quantify paywalls that have not
been identified by crowd-sourced lists, such as paywalls deployed
by unpopular or region-specific sites.
Before describing the classifier in detail, we note two things. First,
the classifier is designed to help detect broad, web-scale trends in
paywall use and behavior, not to detect at real time paywall use
on any single specific site. Second, an important finding of this
classifier is that there is far greater diversity in paywall behavior
and implementation logic than we expected at the start of the effort.
We expect this to be a useful starting point for future studies.
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6.1 Crawling Methodology
The data collection step of our paywall detector, depicted in Fig-
ure 19, begins with three crawls of the target website: (i) the initial
crawl that collects a list of child pages on the website, (ii) the cookie
jar crawl, where each child page is crawled sequentially in the same
browsing session and (iii) the clean crawl, where each child page is
crawled with a fresh browsing session (i.e., a “clean” cookie jar).
This strategy replicates viewing patterns that might cause a
paywall to be triggered, and then attempts to detect the paywall’s
presence by looking for page content that was visible on previous
visits, but is no longer visible. For each page crawled, the crawler
records the final state of the DOM, which DOM elements are visible,
which page elements are positioned to obscure others (e.g., modal
dialogs), and other page execution data only available at runtime.
6.2 Feature Extraction
We selected features that target both immediately triggering pay-
walls and paywalls that trigger after viewing multiple pages. These
features aim to capture an intuition about how paywalls behave,
and can fall into three rough categories: textual features, structural
features, and visual features.
Text features. These features consider the text of the page, target-
ing text and idioms associated with paywalls. The crawler looks for
the phrases “subscribe”, “sign up” and “remaining” (translated into
87 languages) in (i) the “readermode” subset of the page, (ii) any
overlay or popup elements (e.g., elements that have, or are children
of elements that have, z-index values greater than zero), and (iii)
elsewhere in the page. These three checks are performed both in
“cookie jar” and the “clean crawl” recordings of each page.
Several text features use a “readermode” version of page, the
subsection of the document identified as the page’s “main con-
tent”, or the content stripped of page “boilerplate” elements (e.g.,
advertisements, navigation elements, decorative images). While
there are many different “readermode” identification strategies [20],
in this work we use Mozilla’s Readability.js [32] implementation,
because of its popularity and ease of use. We expect using other
“readermode” strategies would work roughly as well.
Structural features. These features target page structure (i.e.,
HTML), independent of specific page text or presentation. Struc-
tural features include whether the website has a RSS or ATOM feed,
changes in the number of text nodes present in the page between its
“cookie jar” and “clean crawl” versions, how many measured pages
contain a “readermode” subset, and the average and maximum dif-
ference in the amount of text in the document in “readermode”,
between “cookie jar” and “clean crawl” measurements.
Visual features. These features focus on visual aspects of mea-
sured pages, and how those visual aspects change between the
“cookie jar” and “clean crawl” measurements for each child page.
The detector measures how many text nodes are obscured and the
average and maximum change in obscured text nodes between the
two measurements for each page. Additional display features are
the number, and change in, text nodes in the browser viewport,
and number of text nodes (regardless of text content) appearing in
overlay (i.e., z-index great than zero) page elements. These features
identify paywalls that prevent users from reading page content
through popups or similar methods.
6.3 Classifier Accuracy
Our paywall detector uses a random forest classifier, specifically the
RandomForestClassifier implementation provided by the popular
SciKit-Learn [54] python library. Classification parameters were
selected through 5-fold evaluation using the entirety of the afore-
mentioned extracted features. As a ground truth, we use a subset of
the paywalled sites the oracle identified (Section 4.1). To assess the
accuracy of the classifier we use a different subset of the oracle’s
data and a set of non-paywalled websites we manually generate.
The paywall detector achieves an average precision of 77%, recall
of 77% and an area under the receiver operating characteristics (AU-
ROC) of 0.74. These results are encouraging and suggest that our
approach can be used to gauge paywall prevalence on the web.
They also indicate that paywalls vary in behavior more than we an-
ticipated, and that more complex features may be needed to further
improve accuracy.
7 RELATEDWORK
In [12], authors perform an empirical study of the pay models
(freemium and paywall models) in European news. In particular,
they manually analyzed a small dataset of 171 of the most important
news organizations in France, Poland, Germany, Italy, Finland, and
UK. Their results show that 66% percent of the newspapers operate
a pay model and that the average price for a monthly subscription
is 13.64 Euros when prices in general range from 2.10 to 54.27 Eu-
ros/month. In our measurements, 3 years after, the average monthly
subscription cost 10.93 Euros, when specifically in Germany it is
20.48 (was 19.75) Euros and in France it is 12.54 (was 13.97) Euros.
In [33], authors explore the content that news publishers consider
worthy of placing behind a paywall. They analyze 614 articles from
the leading Australasian financial newspapers (i.e., the Australian
Financial Review (AFR) and the National Business Review (NBR)).
Results show that publishers consider hard (or fast-paced) news and
opinion pieces as the most valuable news commodity. In addition,
as presented, AFR locked 86% of its content compared to NBR’s 41%.
In [10], authors analyze selected paywalled news sites in US, UK
and Australia to compare the type, pricing and audience uptake.
Results show that paywalls are part of newspapers’ toolkit for
bringing in new revenue but there is no evidence to suggest they
can be a standalone solution. However, in this political economic
environment for mastheads, digital advertising revenues alone are
also insufficient to meet the cost of providing quality journalism.
8 CONCLUSION
Despite the seemingly important implications, paywalls impose on
the free web, as an internet phenomena, they have been understud-
ied. This paper aims to address this blind spot by conducting the
first large scale study of paywalls on the web. Our results show that
paywall use increases over time (2×more paywalls every 6 months),
its adoption differs by country (e.g., 18.75% in US, 12.69% in Aus-
tralia), and besides the privacy implications, paywalls fail to reliably
protect publishers content. Finally, we present the design of a novel,
automated system for detecting whether a site uses a paywall. We
hope this work can be a significant first step in understanding the
phenomena of paywalls.
10
REFERENCES
[1] Adam. 2018. Bypass Paywalls for Chrome. https://github.com/iamadamdev/
bypass-paywalls-chrome.
[2] Andy Appleby. 2016. MurmurHash3. https://github.com/aappleby/smhasher/
wiki/MurmurHash3.
[3] Ricardo Bilton. 2018. Learning from the New Yorker, Wired’s
new paywall aims to build a more ”stable financial future”. http:
//www.niemanlab.org/2018/02/learning-from-the-new-yorker-wireds-
new-paywall-aims-to-build-a-more-stable-financial-future/.
[4] Christian Bonnie. 2017. Google’s latest move means you actually have to pay for
news. https://www.wired.co.uk/article/google-ditches-first-click-free-policy.
[5] Casey Oppenheim Brian Kennish. 2019. Disconnect Browser plugin. https:
//disconnect.me.
[6] Martin Brinkmann. 2016. Read articles behind paywalls by masquerading as
Googlebot. https://www.ghacks.net/2016/02/26/read-articles-behind-paywalls-
by-masquerading-as-googlebot/.
[7] Ryan Brown. 2019. Fanboy’s Enhanced Tracking List. https://github.com/ryanbr/
fanboy-adblock/blob/master/enhancedstats-addon.txt.
[8] Michael Burgi. 2016. What’s Being Done to Rein In $7 Billion in Ad
Fraud. https://www.adweek.com/brand-marketing/whats-being-done-rein-
7-billion-ad-fraud-169743/.
[9] Ian Burrell. 2018. The FT will next year hit 1m subscribers, 17 years after putting
up its paywall. https://www.thedrum.com/opinion/2018/08/30/the-ft-will-next-
year-hit-1m-subscribers-17-years-after-putting-up-its-paywall.
[10] Andrea Carson. 2015. Behind the newspaper paywall–lessons in charging for
online content: a comparative analysis of why Australian newspapers are stuck
in the purgatorial space between digital and print. Media, Culture & Society 37, 7
(2015), 1022–1041.
[11] Nicholas Conley. 2018. The Problem with Paywalls. https:
//nicholasconley.wordpress.com/2018/05/01/the-problem-with-paywalls/.
[12] Alessio Cornia, Annika Sehl, Felix Simon, and Rasmus Kleis Nielsen. 2017. Pay
models in European news. Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism, University
of Oxford (2017).
[13] Florent Daigniere. 2017. A browser extension that maximizes the chances of
bypassing paywalls. https://github.com/nextgens/anti-paywall.
[14] Jerome Dangu. 2018. Uncovering 2017’s Largest Malvertising Op-
eration. https://blog.confiant.com/uncovering-2017s-largest-malvertising-
operation-b84cd38d6b85.
[15] Jessica Davies. 2019. Ghost sites, domain spoofing, fake apps: A guide to knowing
your ad fraud. https://digiday.com/media/ghost-sites-domain-spoofing-fake-
apps-guide-knowing-ad-fraud/.
[16] Jeff Dunn. 2016. Wikipedia is asking for donations again — here’s how much
cash it already has in the bank. https://www.businessinsider.com/wikipedia-
donations-profit-money-chart-2016-11.
[17] Rani Molla Edmund Lee. 2018. The New York Times digital pay-
wall business is growing as fast as Facebook and faster than Google.
https://www.recode.net/2018/2/8/16991090/new-york-times-digital-paywall-
business-growing-fast-facebook-google-newspaper-subscription.
[18] eMarketer. 2017. Google and Facebook Tighten Grip on US Digital Ad Mar-
ket. https://www.emarketer.com/Article/Google-Facebook-Tighten-Grip-on-
US-Digital-Ad-Market/1016494.
[19] Michael Firn. 2018. Optimize Dynamic Paywall Conversions with Machine
Learning. https://www.vidora.com/product-updates/dynamic-paywalls/.
[20] Mohammad Ghasemisharif, Peter Snyder, Andrius Aucinas, and Benjamin
Livshits. 2018. SpeedReader: Reader Mode Made Fast and Private. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1811.03661 (2018).
[21] Roy Greenslade. 2013. Soft paywalls retain more users than hard paywalls - by
a big margin. https://www.theguardian.com/media/greenslade/2014/nov/07/
paywalls-charging-for-content.
[22] Internet Archive. 2001. Wayback Machine. https://archive.org/web/.
[23] Ho Kim, Reo Song, and Youngsoo Kim. 2019. Newspapers’ Content Policy and
the Effect of Paywalls on Pageviews. Journal of Interactive Marketing (2019).
[24] kufii. 2019. Newspaper Paywall Bypasser. https://greasyfork.org/en/scripts/
18585-newspaper-paywall-bypasser/code.
[25] Richard Lawler. 2018. Apple seeks major newspaper allies for its subscription
bundle. https://www.engadget.com/2018/09/08/apple-seeks-major-newspaper-
allies-for-its-subscription-bundle/.
[26] Christophe Leung, Jingjing Ren, David Choffnes, and Christo Wilson. 2016.
Should You Use the App for That?: Comparing the Privacy Implications of
App- and Web-based Online Services. In Proceedings of the 2016 Internet Mea-
surement Conference (IMC ’16). ACM, New York, NY, USA, 365–372. https:
//doi.org/10.1145/2987443.2987456
[27] Bin Liu, Suman Nath, Ramesh Govindan, and Jie Liu. 2014. DECAF: Detecting
and Characterizing Ad Fraud in Mobile Apps. In Proceedings of the 11th USENIX
Conference on Networked Systems Design and Implementation (NSDI’14). USENIX
Association, Berkeley, CA, USA, 57–70. http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=
2616448.2616455
[28] Mike Masnick. 2018. The Media’s Paywall Obsession Will End In Disaster
For Most. https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20180506/11501539779/medias-
paywall-obsession-will-end-disaster-most.shtml.
[29] John McCarthy. 2019. The major trends shaping, breaking and consolidating
global media by 2021. https://www.thedrum.com/news/2019/04/18/the-major-
trends-shaping-breaking-and-consolidating-global-media-2021.
[30] Glyn Moody. 2013. Surprise: Paywalls Cause Massive Falls In Number Of
Visitors - And Boost Competitors. https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20130920/
09592024590/surprise-paywalls-cause-massive-falls-number-visitors-boost-
competitors.shtml.
[31] LuciaMoses. 2017. TheWall Street Journal to close Google loophole entirely. https:
//digiday.com/media/wall-street-journal-close-google-loophole-entirely/.
[32] Mozilla Foundation. 2019. Readability.js. https://github.com/mozilla/readability.
[33] MerjaMyllylahti. 2017. What Content isWorth Locking Behind a Paywall? Digital
news commodification in leading Australasian financial newspapers. Digital
Journalism 5, 4 (2017), 460–471.
[34] Rishab Nithyanand, Sheharbano Khattak, Mobin Javed, Narseo Vallina-Rodriguez,
Marjan Falahrastegar, Julia E Powles, Emiliano De Cristofaro, Hamed Haddadi,
and Steven J Murdoch. 2016. Adblocking and counter blocking: A slice of the
arms race. In 6th {USENIX} Workshop on Free and Open Communications on the
Internet ({FOCI} 16).
[35] Rodrigo Orem and Caio. 2018. Burlesco: Read news without subscribing, bypass
the paywall. https://burles.co/en/.
[36] Outline. 2018. Outline - Read & annotate without distractions. https://
outline.com/.
[37] Michalis Pachilakis, Panagiotis Papadopoulos, Evangelos P Markatos, and Nicolas
Kourtellis. 2019. No More Chasing Waterfalls: A Measurement Study of the
Header Bidding Ad-Ecosystem. In Proceedings of the 19th Internet Measurement
Conference (IMC 2019).
[38] Elias P Papadopoulos, Michalis Diamantaris, Panagiotis Papadopoulos, Thanasis
Petsas, Sotiris Ioannidis, and Evangelos P Markatos. 2017. The long-standing
privacy debate: Mobile websites vs mobile apps. In Proceedings of the 26th Interna-
tional Conference onWorldWideWeb. International WorldWideWeb Conferences
Steering Committee, 153–162.
[39] Panagiotis Papadopoulos, Panagiotis Ilia, and Evangelos P Markatos. 2018. Truth
in Web Mining: Measuring the Profitability and Cost of Cryptominers as a Web
Monetization Model. arXiv preprint arXiv:1806.01994 (2018).
[40] Panagiotis Papadopoulos, Nicolas Kourtellis, and Evangelos Markatos. 2019.
Cookie synchronization: Everything you always wanted to know but were afraid
to ask. In The World Wide Web Conference. 1432–1442.
[41] Panagiotis Papadopoulos, Nicolas Kourtellis, and Evangelos P Markatos. 2018.
The cost of digital advertisement: Comparing user and advertiser views. In
Proceedings of the 2018 World Wide Web Conference. International World Wide
Web Conferences Steering Committee, 1479–1489.
[42] Panagiotis Papadopoulos, Nicolas Kourtellis, Pablo Rodriguez Rodriguez, and
Nikolaos Laoutaris. 2017. If you are not paying for it, you are the product:
How much do advertisers pay to reach you?. In Proceedings of the 2017 Internet
Measurement Conference. ACM, 142–156.
[43] Ben Parr. 2011. What Impact Has The New York Times Paywall Had on Traffic?
[STATS]. https://mashable.com/2011/04/11/new-york-times-paywall-stats/.
[44] Piano Inc. 2015. Overview - Tinypass for Developers. http://
developer.tinypass.com/.
[45] Piano Inc. 2019. Algorithmic Paywall. https://docs.piano.io/algorithmic-
paywall/.
[46] Dominic Ponsford. 2017. Press Gazette launches Duopoly cam-
paign to stop Google and Facebook destroying journalism. https:
//www.pressgazette.co.uk/press-gazette-launches-duopoly-campaign-
to-stop-google-and-facebook-destroying-journalism/.
[47] publicWWW. 2019. Source Code Search Engine. https://publicwww.com/.
[48] Abbas Razaghpanah, Rishab Nithyanand, Narseo Vallina-Rodriguez, Srikanth
Sundaresan, Mark Allman, and Christian Kreibich Phillipa Gill. 2018. Apps,
trackers, privacy, and regulators. In Proceedings of the Network and Distributed
System Security Symposium (NDSS’18).
[49] Patricio Robles. 2017. Google ditches first click free, embraces paywalls. https:
//econsultancy.com/google-ditches-first-click-free-embraces-paywalls/.
[50] Janko Roettgers. 2017. BuzzFeed CEO Jonah Peretti: Paywalls Are Bad for Democ-
racy. https://variety.com/2017/digital/news/buzzfeed-jonah-peretti-paywalls-
democracy-1202593489/.
[51] Sam Rutherford. 2018. Google Thinks It Can Make Paywalls Less of a Pain in the
Ass. https://gizmodo.com/google-thinks-it-can-make-paywalls-less-of-a-pain-
in-th-1823925612.
[52] Felix Salmon. 2011. The NYT paywall is working. http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-
salmon/2011/07/26/the-nyt-paywall-is-working/.
[53] Zach Saucier. 2018. Just Read. https://justread.link/.
[54] Scikit-learn developers. 2019. Scikit-learn: Machine Learning in Python. https:
//scikit-learn.org/stable/index.html.
[55] Felix Simon and Lucas Graves. 2019. Across seven countries, the
average price for paywalled news is about $15.75/month. https:
11
//www.niemanlab.org/2019/05/across-seven-countries-the-average-price-for-
paywalled-news-is-about-15-75-month/.
[56] Lucinda Southern. 2018. How Swiss news publisher NZZ built a flexible paywall
using machine learning. https://digiday.com/media/swiss-news-publisher-nzz-
built-flexible-paywall-using-machine-learning/.
[57] Duncan Stewart. 2018. Are Consumers ’Adlergic’? A Look at Ad-Blocking
Habits. https://deloitte.wsj.com/cmo/2018/04/03/are-consumers-adlergic-a-
look-at-ad-blocking-habits/.
[58] Fitz Tepper. 2017. Facebook is now testing paywalls and subscriptions for Instant
Articles. https://techcrunch.com/2017/10/19/facebook-is-now-testing-paywalls-
and-subscriptions-for-instant-article/.
[59] Narseo Vallina-Rodriguez, Srikanth Sundaresan, Abbas Razaghpanah, Rishab
Nithyanand, Mark Allman, Christian Kreibich, and Phillipa Gill. 2016. Track-
ing the trackers: Towards understanding the mobile advertising and tracking
ecosystem. arXiv preprint arXiv:1609.07190 (2016).
[60] Antoine Vastel, Peter Snyder, and Benjamin Livshits. 2018. Who filters the
filters: Understanding the growth, usefulness and efficiency of crowdsourced ad
blocking. arXiv preprint arXiv:1810.09160 (2018).
[61] Shan Wang. 2018. After years of testing, The Wall Street Jour-
nal has built a paywall that bends to the individual reader. http:
//www.niemanlab.org/2018/02/after-years-of-testing-the-wall-street-journal-
has-built-a-paywall-that-bends-to-the-individual-reader/.
[62] Nate Weiner. 2007. Pocket - Put knowledge in your Pocket. https://
getpocket.com.
[63] Wikimedia Foundation. 2018. 2016-2017 Fundraising Report. https://
foundation.wikimedia.org/wiki/2016-2017FundraisingReport.
[64] Apostolis Zarras, Alexandros Kapravelos, Gianluca Stringhini, Thorsten Holz,
Christopher Kruegel, and Giovanni Vigna. 2014. The Dark Alleys of Madison
Avenue: Understanding Malicious Advertisements. In Proceedings of the 2014
Conference on Internet Measurement Conference (IMC ’14).
12
